Privacy-preserving Wi-Fi Access Scheme for VANETs
(Full Paper)
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ABSTRACT
Recently, great progress has been made in the study of Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) to solve road congestion and prevent traffic accidents. To pursue the life quality, driving comfort and entertainment requirements are necessary, such as surfing the Internet, searching nearby gas stations, restaurants, etc. Hence, vehicles have to access to the Internet via Wi-Fi hotspots provided by roadside units (RSUs). Obviously, the connection to RSUs reveals the driving routine. The location privacy of vehicles is seriously threatened. In this paper, we propose a novel approach to protect the location privacy while accessing to Wi-Fi hotspots (RSUs). We adopt the idea of 'off-the-record' communication to achieve the privacy property. In other words, the vehicle performs a deniable authentication with RSU while accessing to Wi-Fi hotpot and the participants should have the deniability capability. RSU provides the Internet service to the vehicle if authentication completes. On the other hand, this authentication conversation leaves no ‘paper trail’ and therefore, the vehicle can deny to a third party that the fact of the authentication occurred since the communication transcript could be produced (simulated) by others.

Keywords: Location privacy, Wi-Fi hotpots access, privacy-preserving authentication, deniability.

INTRODUCTION
With the development of society, the vehicles have become the essential for people to travel. The increase of vehicles also brings many problems such as traffic congestion, traffic accidents and so on. Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) emerge to solve above problems, and hence have been highly concerned by automobile manufacturers, research institutions and governments. VANETs are the new large-scale mobile ad hoc networks composed of On-board Units (OBUs) and Road-side Units (RSUs). The communication between the OBUs and RSUs can realize efficient accident warning, auxiliary driving, road traffic information query, Internet services and so on.

However, VANETs encounter the great threat of privacy leakage while improving the security, efficiency and convenience of the transportation system. The traffic information such as speed, location, direction and the regularity of vehicle movement are useful for VANETs, but sensitive for users privacy. As people pay more and more attention to personal privacy, the design of an effective privacy-preserving mechanism has become a key issue in the successful deployment of VANETs.

On the other hand, vehicles need Internet service while driving to improve the quality of driving experience, such as surfing the Internet, searching nearby gas stations, restaurants, etc. Most applications support RSUs to use WLAN access mode to provide the Internet service for vehicles. The IP/MAC address is necessary for the authentication during the access procedure. Obviously, connection to RSUs which play the role of Wi-Fi hotspots leaks the drive routines of vehicles. Therefore, location privacy of the vehicle is focused while accessing to Wi-Fi.
Related Work
When the vehicle connects to a Wi-Fi hotspot to obtain the Internet service, this access point (AP) records vehicle information (e.g., IP/MAC address) from the authentication procedure. Since the AP location is fixed, this vehicle can be located obviously. Therefore, it is possible to pinpoint the location of a user to a particular depot, or a particular section of a square. Location privacy is necessary concerned while accessing to Wi-Fi for vehicles.

To address the location privacy issue in wireless environments, several approaches are proposed. Schilit, Hong and Gruteser (2003) proposed Wireless Location Privacy-preserving for the first time. This paper points out that with the development of Wi-Fi and location services, it will bring great challenges to user's location privacy. And assume some privacy risks, which now seems to exist. Then there are some K-anonymity schemes (Gruteser & Grunwald, 2003; Yang et al., 2013) which are the most widely adopted. Such schemes attempt to fuzz the location resolution by hiding a mobile user from a certain range including k-1 other mobile users. However, considering the lightweight setup in Wi-Fi deployment sites, they are confronted with the challenge of lacking the trusted third party whose job is to relay the communication between the mobile users and the LBS provider. Titkov and Poslad (2003) realizes user anonymity through a Mediator Agent, either a user-controlled or a trusted-third-party mediator that separates mobile terminals from service providers on the fixed network. Raghunath and Narayanaswami (2007) works by examining each unique identifier that can be used to associate location information with a particular subscriber, and making each such identifier useless. Quigley et al. (2004) proposes location obfuscation: LBSs can only access a uniformly downscaled location information (with lower precision and lower geographical granularity) instead of exact client positions. Bellavista, Corradi and Giannelli (2005) presents the privacy-related extension of our proxy-based mobile agent middleware to support personalized service provisioning to Wi-Fi portable devices. Jiang, Wang and Hu (2007) obfuscate several types of privacy-compromising information revealed by a mobile node, including sender identity, time of transmission, and signal strength. Peng, Kaji and Kawaguchi (2014) presented an algorithm that determined the reliability of the user by considering the probability of both spatial and temporal to resolve the privacy problem in Wi-Fi based location estimation.

As far as we know, most of the existing schemes involve third party participation or fuzzy location based schemes. In a scheme with a third party, the assumption that a third party can be completely trusted is very strong. In the location based fuzzy scheme, SP can not get the exact location, thereby reducing the quality of service. In this paper, we propose a scheme that requires neither third party nor fuzzy location. This does not only protect the user's location privacy, but also does not reduce the quality of service.

Contribution
We propose a location privacy-preserving scheme while vehicles accessing to the Wi-Fi hotpots to obtain the Internet service. Different with the existing schemes, we adopt a novel idea to achieve the privacy property. We make use of the deniability to provide the conversations with 'off-the-record'. Technically, we employ the deniable authentication (Zeng et al., 2018) as the building block to protect the location privacy of vehicles while connecting to the Wi-Fi hotspots. Vehicle submits its identity (i.e., IP/MAC address) to the server (RSU) to obtain the Internet service for the authentication. This is the evidence to disclosure its drive circuit and hence leak the location privacy. To meet the location privacy of OBUs, we require the authentication protocol satisfying the deniability. In the end of the execution of authentication, RSU can be convinced that OBU is the legal user to gain the Internet service. On the other hand, the deniability prevents that RSU to show the evidence to the third party as the conversation transcript can be simulated by anyone including RSU. Therefore, the location privacy of OBU is perfectly protected.

We design this deniable authentication protocol by using the projective hash function (Zeng et al., 2017).}

Organization
This paper is organized as follows. We review the properties of projective hash function which is an essential tool to construct the protocols and the notion of deniable authentication in the section 2. We introduce the architecture of VANETs and the principle of Wi-Fi access in the model of VANETs in the section 3. We construct the deniable authentication based on the projective hash function and then instantiate this protocol to protect the location privacy while accessing to the Wi-Fi hotspots in the VANETs environment in the section 4. We analyze the security and performance of our proposed protocol in the following section and conclude this paper in the last section.

PRELIMINARIES

Projective Hash Function
Projective hash functions were introduced by Cramer and Shoup (2002) and later formalized by Benhamouda et al. (2013). The properties (projection and smoothness) of projective hash functions are used to achieve the authentication in our scheme. We first review the original definition of projective hash functions.
Definition. Define a domain $\chi$ and an NP language $L$ with $L \subseteq \chi$. The projective hash function is over $L$. For a word $c \in L$, the value of this function can be calculated by either a secret hashing key $hk$ or a public projection key $hp$ with a witness $\omega$ of the fact that $c \in L$. Specifically, a projective hash function over $L \subseteq \chi$ is defined as follows.

- $\text{HashKG}(L)$: Use the $L$ to generate a secret hashing key $hk$;
- $\text{projKG}(hk, L)$: Use the $hk$ generated in the previous step to generate a projection key $hp$, which is public;
- $\text{Hash}(hk, L, c)$: Use the hashing key $hk$ and the word $c \in L$ to calculate the value of this hash function.
- $\text{projHash}(hp, L, c, \omega)$: output the value of this hash function by using the projection key $hp$, the witness $\omega$ for the word $c \in L$.

Projection. We say this hash function is projective if $\text{Hash}(hk, L, c) = \text{projHash}(hp, L, c, \omega)$. That means the value of the hash function can be computed even without knowing the secret hashing key $hk$.

Smoothness. This projective hash function is smooth if $c \notin L$, then $\text{Hash}(hk, L, c)$ is statistically indistinguishable from a random value. That means it gives no information about the hash value of any point out of $L$.

Deniable Authentication
Deniable authentication is first formally introduced by Dwork, Naor and Sahai (1998, 2006), which provides a property to facilitate privacy-preserving communication. The receiver is convinced that sender’s authentication to some message $m$, however, will not be able to convince any third party that the fact of this authentication occurred as this communication transcript can be produced without the knowledge of sender’s secret. With the implementation of deniable authentication to our application, Wi-Fi hotspots (RSUs) accepts vehicles (OBUs)’s authentication to the identity (IP/MAC address) while RSUs cannot convince anyone else that the fact of this service has been requested by someone. Therefore, when vehicle connects to Wi-Fi for Internet service, its identity cannot be the evidence in the authentication. In other words, connection to some RSUs do not imply the vehicle routine and the location privacy follows.

A secure deniable authentication protocol must satisfy the following fundamental security requirements.

- Authentication. The receiver can be convinced of the source and accepts the intended sender if the two parties follow the authentication protocol honestly.

- Deniability. The sender can deny its involvement in an authentication. The receiver accepts the authentication while can not convince a third party the fact of this authentication occurred. Formally, this property is captured by simulation. We require that the simulator can produce a communication transcript without sender’s secret and the simulated conversation can not be distinguished.

SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we briefly introduce the VANETs system model, the Wi-Fi access model and the privacy requirement.

VANETs
The common VANETs system with privacy protection mainly consists of four entities: the Transportation Regulation Center (TRC), the road-side units (RSUs) and the on-board units (OBUs) equipped on moving vehicles. With the increasing demand for network, SPs has become a very important part of VANETs. The model for VANETs is shown in Figure 2. Concretely:

- TRC. TRC is the top management of the system, with sufficient storage space and computing power, generally considered to be completely reliable. TRC in our scheme is an institution which is in charge of identity authentication, issuing and recycling certificate of each vehicle. Moreover, TRC can trace the target vehicle which involved in a traffic dispute.

- RSU. RSU is the Infrastructure of Vehicle Ad Hoc Network, with strong storage space and computing power, generally considered to be not completely credible. RSU is responsible for receiving a certificate application from OBU, forwarding the application to the local TRC, and forwarding the response of TRC to OBU. RSU broadcasts road information and security information received from other RSU or collected by themselves, as well as providing OBU with Wi-Fi hotspots and OBU connections to Wi-Fi hotspots to enjoy network services.

- OBU. OBU is the infrastructure of each vehicle, with weak storage space and computing power, which is generally considered untrustworthy. Each OBU should broadcast its routine safety messages when they are on the road, such as position, direction, speed, traffic conditions and traffic events. Thereout, the communication between two vehicles or vehicle to RSU can assist drivers
to get a better awareness of their environment and take action earlier. OBU can also access network services via RSU Wi-Fi to improve the driving experience.

• SP. SP provides information services for registered OBU, such as location services, mail services, network services, etc. Although most of the SP does not depend on the vehicle ad hoc network, it is also a very important object in the vehicle network communication. So, the service provider is also an indispensable role in the model system model of the VANETs.

**Wi-Fi access model**
Wi-Fi (Wireless Fidelity), a short-range wireless transmission technology, enables users to access to the Internet within hundreds of meters and provides users with network services. The Wi-Fi access model is shown in Figure 3, and the Wi-Fi network structure is as follows:

• Station. The most basic component of the network.
• BSS. BSS(Basic Service Set) is the most basic service unit of the network. The simplest service unit can consist of only two sites. The site can dynamically associate to the basic service unit.

![Figure 2: Vanets system model](image)

• DS. The DS(Distribution System) is used to connect different basic service units.
• AP. The AP(Access Point) has the identity of the ordinary site and the function of accessing the distribution system.
• ESS. ESS(Extended Service Set) is composed of Distribution System and Basic Service Set. This combination is logical, not physical.
• Portal. It is also a logical element. Used to associate WLAN with wired local area networks or other networks.

![Figure 3: Wi-Fi access model](image)

For the VANETs environment, the on-board Internet access mechanism can meet the needs for Internet access during travel, but it suffers the threat of location privacy. When vehicles access to RSU for Internet service, some regular access records (i.e., IP/MAC address, access duration, link bandwidth, and time between last visit, etc.) imply the footprints of vehicles. Since the RSU location is open and fixed. The vehicle location is also revealed if it has access to some RSU.
Privacy Definitions for VANETs
The privacy protection is the main challenge for VANETs. The sensitive information for users is the identity, the position and the requested service. The user has to show his identity when performs the authentication protocol. The identity protection requires the user identity is anonymous to anyone. The position and requested service belong to data privacy. When performs the VANETs authentication protocol, such information should be confidential to outsiders. Informally, the privacy requirements are stated as the following aspects:

Data privacy. Data privacy, is to protect the content of the communication itself is not known by entities outside the communication scene. For example, in Wi-Fi access, the RSU acts as a communication gateway, and the vehicle connects the Wi-Fi provided by RSU to communicate with SP. The vehicle is informed of the contents of its upload or download from SP, but in the process of communication, the transcript of the communication between the vehicle and SP does not wish to be obtained by a third party.

Identity privacy. Identity privacy, is to protect the identity of the communication entity is not known by a third party. Identity may be practical, but it can also be a e-mail address, employee number, etc. For example, when a vehicle accesses a email server via Wi-Fi, it does not want a third party to know its email address.

Location privacy. Location privacy, which protects the current or past communication location of the entity from being known outside the communication scene. For example, in Wi-Fi access, vehicles do not want SP to know where they are. If the communication location of the vehicle appears many times in the same family house, it can be speculated that the communication entity may be a member of the family, thus destroy the identity privacy of the entity.

By comparison, the challenge of location privacy protection is more prominent. The reasons mainly come from three aspects: (1) The quantity of location information is very large and it is very frequent to publish; (2) The change of location information is in accordance with the regularity of vehicle movement, and a very small amount of information leakage may give an attacker space for data mining. (3) Location correctness is the cornerstone of many vehicle applications and limits privacy protection.

OUR PROTOCOLS
In the process of the vehicle accessing to Wi-Fi hotspots, say RSUs, the IP/MAC address is the critical information submitted to RSUs. Therefore, the connection to RSU implies vehicle location. We adopt a novel idea to realize the location privacy while accessing to Internet via Wi-Fi hotspots. Since RSU knows the IP/MAC address of vehicle during authentication, the location privacy is preserved by deniability. The vehicle submits its identity (i.e., IP/MAC address) to RSU for authentication. RSU returns the Internet service to the corresponding vehicle if the authentication is valid. On the other hand, vehicle can deny the involvement in this authentication to the third party as this authentication is with ‘off-the-record’, RSU can not convince anyone else that the vehicle’s connection.

In this section, we first construct a deniable authentication protocol based on the projective hash function. Then we instantiate this deniable authentication to construct a privacy-preserving Wi-Fi access scheme for VANETs.

Deniable Authentication based on Projective Hash Function
We give a generic construction of authentication protocol with deniability based on projective hash function. For each participant $P$ in the system, it obtains the key pair $(SK, PK)$ by invoking the hashing key generation algorithm $HashKG(L)$ and the projection key generation algorithm $projKG(hk, L)$ respectively. The public key of $P$ is $PK = hp$ and the private key of $P$ is $SK = hk$ . The sender $S$ authenticates a message $m \in M$ to the receiver $R$ and $S$ wishes to deny its involvement after executing the authentication. $S$ sends its public key $PK$ to the receiver $R$ . Upon the receipts of $PK$ from $S$, $R$ begins to interact with $S$ to execute the authentication.

Key Generation.
This algorithm is done by each participant $P$ itself. The private/public keypair of each $P$ is $(SK, PK) = (hk, hp)$, where $hk$ is the hashing key and the projection key $hp$ is the projection key.

Deniable Authentication Protocol.
With $PK$, message $m \leftarrow M$ and $NP$ language $L$ . $R$ picks a word $c \in L$ with the witness $\omega$, sends $flow_i = (m, c)$ to $S$.
Upon the receipt of \((m,c)\) from \(R\), \(S\) first computes the hash value by using the private hashing key \(hk\) and the word \(c\), then hides this hash value by a secure commitment scheme \(COM\). \(S\) does as following:

-- compute \(\sigma = Hash(hk, L, c; m)\) with the word \(c\), the message \(m\) and its private key \(SK = hk\);
-- choose \(r\) randomly, compute \(C = COM(\sigma, r)\);
-- send \(flow_2 = C\) to the receiver \(R\).

Upon the receipt of the commitment \(C\), \(R\) reveals \(\omega\) and sends \(flow_2 = \omega\) to \(S\).

Upon the receipt of \(\omega\), \(S\) first checks that the value \(\omega\) is indeed the witness for \(c \in L\):

-- check \(projHash(hp, L, c, \omega, m) = \sigma\);

If this equation holds, \(S\) is sure that it can deny successfully later. Then, \(S\) reveals \(r\) to \(R\). \(R\) calculates \(rCOMC = \sigma\).

\(R\) is convinced \(S\)'s authentication to \(m\) if \(CC = C\).

**Authentication.** If the sender returns the right \(\sigma\) implies the sender knows the corresponding private key of \(PK\) due to the smoothness of projective hash function. The soundness of the commitment scheme \(COM\) implies \(\sigma\) is calculated before \(R\)'s disclosure. The authentication follows.

**Deniability.** Since \(R\) reveals the witness \(\omega\) in the step 3, anyone can generate the authentication transcript as the sender. Therefore, \(S\) can deny its authentication.

**Privacy-preserving Wi-Fi Access Protocol based on Deniable Authentication**

With the property of deniable authentication, we propose a novel approach to protect the location privacy while accessing to Wi-Fi hotspots in VANETs. In our construction, the vehicle submits its identity (IP/MAC address) to RSU to run the deniable authentication. We instantiate our construction by employing a concrete projective hash function. The notations of our scheme are listed in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(U_i)</td>
<td>The vehicle (i).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(id_i)</td>
<td>The identity of (U_i).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IP)</td>
<td>The user’s IP address.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MAC)</td>
<td>Media Access Control address.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((s_i, v_i))</td>
<td>The private/public key pair of (U_i).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(COM)</td>
<td>A public commitment scheme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Let \(\mathbb{G}\) be a group of primer order \(p\) and \(g, h \in \mathbb{G}\) the generators of \(\mathbb{G}\). \(H\) is a collision-free hash function: \(\{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p\). The system parameter \(para = (\mathbb{G}, p, g, h, H)\).

**Key Gen.** Each \(U_i\) chooses \(x, y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p\), sets \(h_y = (x, y)\), \(h_y = g^{xh^v}\). \(U_i\)'s keypair is \((s, v_i) = (h_y, h_y)\).

1. \(U_i \rightarrow RSU : U_i\) submits \(m = id || IP || MAC\) to \(RSU\) to request the Internet service.
2. \(RSU \rightarrow U_i :\) Upon the receipt of message \(flow_1 = m\), \(RSU\) chooses a random \(\omega \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p\) and computes \(c = (g^\omega, h^\omega)\). \(RSU\) sends \(flow_2 = (m, c)\) to \(U_i\).
3. \(U_i \rightarrow RSU :\) Upon the receipt of \((m, c)\) from \(RSU\), \(U_i\) first computes the hash value by using its private key \(s\) and the word \(c\), then hides this hash value by a secure commitment scheme \(COM\). \(U_i\) does as follow:

-- compute \(\sigma = H(s, L, c; m) = g^{xk}h^{\omega k}g^{H(m)}\) with the word \(c = (g^\omega, h^\omega)\) the message \(m\) and its private key \(s\);
-- choose \(r\) randomly, compute \(C = COM(\sigma, r)\);
-- send \(flow_3 = C\) to the receiver \(RSU\).
4. **RSU → U_i**: Upon the receipt of the commitment $C$, RSU reveals $\omega$ and sends $flow_4 = \omega$ to the $U_i$.

5. **U_i → RSU**: Upon the receipt of $\omega$, $U_i$ first checks that the value $\omega$ is indeed the witness for $c \in L$:

\[
\text{-- check } (g^x h^y)^\omega g^{h(m)} = \sigma; \\
\]

If this equation holds, $U_i$ is sure that it can deny successfully later. Then $U_i$ reveals $r$ to RSU. RSU is convinced $U_i$'s authentication to $m$ by calculating $\sigma = (g^x h^y)^\omega g^{h(m)}$, $C' = COM(\sigma, r)$ and checks $C' = C$ or not.

**Remark.** With the development of vehicle networking industry, 5G network technology develops rapidly. (5G network has the characteristics of high transmission rate, low delay, high stability, flexible network architecture and so on.) Vehicle networking based on 5G is developing more and more rapidly in recent years, which provides a better network environment for the realization of our scheme.

**SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE**

We analyze the security and performance of our proposal in this section. We mainly discuss that how does our protocol achieve the privacy protection. Then we focus on the performance of this protocol execution.

**Security Analysis**

Vehicles in VANETs connect to Wi-Fi hotpots to obtain the Internet service. Obviously, this connection leaks vehicle location through authentication. Thus, we analyze that how does the user obtains the Internet service (Authentication) from accessing to Wi-Fi hotspots without privacy leakage (Location Privacy).

**Authentication.** Wi-Fi access requires user’s authentication. The vehicle is authenticated by RSU if it can calculate $\sigma$. This value can be computed only by $SK$. Due to the computational binding of the commitment scheme and the smoothness of the projective hash function, no one other than $U_i$ can forge the authentication. Concretely, $U_i$ computes $\sigma = H(x_i, L_i, c, m) = g^{ak_i} h^{\omega k} g^{h(m)}$ by using its private key $h_{k_i} = (x_i, y_i)$. This value $\sigma$ is accepted by RSU as it can produce the same $\sigma$ by using the witness $\omega$ and $U_i$’s public key. Since the commitment scheme is sound, the committed value can not be modified to $\hat{\sigma}$ after the disclosure of $\omega$.

**Location Privacy.** Our location privacy is achieved by the deniability. The tuple $(id, IP, MAC)$ is submitted for authentication. However, it is the sensitive information for vehicles. The record of each connection to RSU with fixed location reveals vehicle location. If the user (vehicle) has the deniability property, the record of each authentication is not the evidence that this vehicle has been here before. Therefore, we require that this conversation transcript between $U_i$ and RSU can be perfectly simulated and this simulation cannot be distinguishable. This is achieved by that RSU reveals the witness $\omega$ in the step 4. With $\omega$, anyone can produce the right $\sigma$ by $\sigma = (g^x h^y)^\omega g^{h(m)}$. Therefore, there is no evidence that $U_i$ has access to RSU. The location privacy of vehicle $U_i$ follows.

**Performance**

Our proposal is a kind of cryptographic-based approach to protect user privacy in VANETs. The fundamental disadvantage of this category is the high computation and communication complexity. However, the main advantage of cryptographic-based approach is the strong privacy and security. It is inevitable to use cryptographic algorithms in order to preserve security.

We simulate the process of our scheme. We employ Inter Core i5 2.70GHz with 8GB RAM and the result is shown in Figure 4. We calculate the time it takes for OBU to authenticate under the security parameters $K1=256$ and $K2=512$, respectively. Obviously, the larger the security parameters, the longer the authentication time. In order to estimate the performance of our scheme accurately, as shown in figure 4, we have run the experiments several times under both security parameters. When the security parameter is $K1=256$, the first running-time is 1.971ms, the second running-time is 2.063ms, the third running-time is 2.153ms.... The average running-time under $K1$ is 2.095ms. When the security parameter is $K2 = 512$, the first running-time is 6.796ms, the second running-time is 7.326ms, the third running-time is 7.126ms.... The average running-time under $K2$ is 7.153ms.
In this work, we propose a novel approach that enables the user to access the Wi-Fi hotspots without location privacy leakage for vehicles in VANETs. We employ the deniable authentication to construct the protocol to provide the strong privacy. Although RSU obtains the user’s identity from the authentication, it cannot convince anyone else that this user has connected to RSU, thus it has no evidence to locate this vehicle. More importantly, the 5G era is fast approaching. The 5G network technology will meet the need of high transmission rate and large capacity data processing in the vehicle network. We will consider this scheme based on 5G network in the future research.

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